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Abstract 
 
The last decade has seen a worldwide move by emerging markets to adopt explicit or implicit 
inflation targeting regimes. A notable and often discussed exception to this trend, of course, is 
China which follows pegged exchange rate regime supported by capital controls. Another major 
exception is India. It is not clear how to characterize the monetary regime or identify the nominal 
monetary anchor in India. Is central bank policy in India following a predictable rule that is 
heavily influenced by a quasi inflation target? To address this point, we investigate monetary 
policy regime change in India using a Markov switching model to estimate a time-varying 
Taylor-type rule for the Reserve Bank of India. We find that the conduct of monetary policy over 
the last two decades can be characterized by two regimes, which we term ‘hawk’ and ‘dove.’ In 
the first of these regimes, the central bank reveals a greater relative (though not absolute) weight 
on controlling inflation vis-à-vis narrowing the output gap. The central bank was in the “dove” 
regime about half of the sample period, during these episodes focusing more on the output gap 
and exchange rate targets to stimulate exports, rather than on moderating inflation. India is 
following its own direction in the conduct of monetary policy, seemingly not overly influenced 
by the emphasis on quasi-inflation targeting seen in many emerging markets.  
 
 
 
 
This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at the 6th NIPFP-DEA Research Meeting held in New 
Delhi, India, March 9-10, 2010. We are grateful to our discussant, Ila Patnaik, and to conference participants, for 
helpful comments that have led to substantial improvement in the paper. Of course, they are absolved of all 
responsibility for remaining shortcomings.
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1. Introduction 
 
A major switch in the conduct of monetary policy has occurred in many nations over the 
past two decades. Although taking different forms, the switch has been towards more systematic 
rules and less discretion in the conduct of monetary policy. Many central banks in emerging 
markets have adopted formal inflation targets, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Korea, Hungary, Israel, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. 
Other central banks have adopted systematic rules that de facto describe the behavior of the 
central bank’s operating instrument response—usually interbank interest rates-- to inflation, 
output gaps and the external environment. Rose (2007) argues that the move to IT regimes, either 
explicitly or implicitly (e.g. adopting systemic rules focusing on inflation), has created a new 
monetary system that is more stable and durable than its predecessors, especially exchange rate 
targeting and fixed exchange rates such as existed in the Bretton Woods system. 
Theoretical studies that derive optimal monetary policy rules, and empirical studies that 
investigate their use in practice, are now commonplace in the literature (e.g. Taylor, 1993; 
Clarida, Gali, Gertler, 2000; Woodford, 2001). Taylor (1993) formulated a policy rule by which 
the U.S. Federal Reserve adjusts the policy rate in response to past inflation and the output gap 
(actual less potential output). He showed that this rule described Federal Reserve policy 
performance quite well from 1987 to 1992. Using a quadratic loss function for the welfare 
objective of the central bank, Woodford (2001) provided a formal normative justification for 
following a Taylor-type rule under certain conditions. Many studies subsequently applied and 
developed this class of policy rule to examine the behavior of central banks in industrialized 
countries (e.g., Clarida et al., 2000), and several have been applied to emerging and developing 
economies (e.g. Aizenman et al., 2008; Gonçalves and Salles, 2008). In fact, Gonçalves and 
Salles (2008) find that in a sample of 36 emerging market economies (13 of which implemented 
the IT regime), the IT adopters had greater drops in inflation and growth volatility compared to 
the non-adopters. 
In light of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, it may be premature to make a final 
judgment on the desirability and durability of IT regimes and whether their widespread adoption 
has actually ushered in a new era of world monetary stability. It is noteworthy that the two most 
populous, largest and, arguably, dynamic emerging markets, China and India, have not adopted 
IT regimes and withstood the global financial crisis quite well. China follows a quasi-fixed 
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exchange rate regime against the U.S. Dollar, accumulating massive international reserves and 
maintaining tight capital controls to keep the parity unchanged (e.g. Glick and Hutchison, 2009; 
Ouyang, et al., 2010). The monetary policy regime is less explicit and apparently more dynamic 
in India, with the authorities typically arguing that discretion is paramount in their policy 
decisions.1  
The objective of our paper is to investigate the nature of monetary policy rules in India, a 
country that has undergone major domestic and international financial development and 
deregulation over the past two decades. These developments have changed the financial 
environment and external constraints (e.g. balance of payments, exchange rates and regime 
shifts) facing the central bank (Reserve Bank of India, RBI), and may have influenced its 
operating procedures and policy tradeoffs between output-inflation-exchange rate stabilization. 
These considerations, in turn, may have influenced the formulation of the monetary policy rule in 
India. In particular, money market deregulation took place in 1987. Prior to that time, the money 
market was highly regulated and the interest rate was essentially fixed.2 Since 1987 there has 
been much greater flexibility in money market rates, and the RBI started using it as the primary 
operating instrument of monetary policy. To this end, we investigate the monetary policy rule in 
India and whether simple Taylor-like policy rules—perhaps changing over time to account for 
the varying economic environment – may be employed to systematically describe central bank 
actions. The RBI describes its policy actions in terms of discretion, and states that a multitude of 
factors are taken into consideration when deciding the course of monetary policy. The question is 
whether the seemingly discretionary policy followed by the RBI may be empirically described 
by a systemic rule that allows for occasional regime switches.  
Therefore, our paper focuses on the monetary policy rule in India, and contributes to the 
literature by adopting a regime switching model along the lines of Hamilton (1989) to allow for 
multiple changes over time in central bank preferences between “Hawk” and “Dove” monetary 
regimes that in turn shift the central bank operating policy rule. Previous work for emerging 
markets has focused on a stable monetary policy rule (constant coefficients) over time or perhaps 
                                                           
1 Since India and China are both in the Gonçalves and Salles (2008) sample of non-IT adopters, our analysis 
provides a useful complement to theirs for the Indian case, though our approach does not explicitly examine the kind 
of comparison they make.  
2 While arguments can be made for later starting dates, given the evolution of financial liberalization in India, and of 
the RBI’s conduct of monetary policy, this particular liberalization episode seems to be the most appropriate 
beginning for our sample period. 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a discrete shift from one rule to another in line with a change in the central bank leadership, 
institutional change or political change3. None has focused on regime switching in India. Our 
approach, by contrast, allows for the Indian central bank to operate in either of two regimes, and 
switch from one regime to another multiple times in response to changes in the economic 
conditions (e.g. inflation rate, output gap, and the exchange rate). For example, at times the 
central bank may be primarily concerned with inflation in a “Hawk” regime—perhaps because 
inflation is viewed as the primary threat to economic stability—while at other times the primary 
focus may be shifted to stimulating output (“Dove” regime). These shifts may occur predictably 
over the business cycle or at other times, not necessarily representing an institutional change but 
simply a complex policy rule that changes over time, shifting with a given probability in 
response to an evolving economic environment.  
Our application of the regime switching model to Indian monetary policy is interesting in 
its own right. Much like the US Federal Reserve, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has seemingly 
responded to the state of the economy in an apparently discretionary and flexible manner. A 
former Deputy Governor of the RBI described their approach as follows, “Thus the overall 
objective has had to be approached in a flexible and time variant manner with a continuous 
rebalancing of priority between growth and price stability, depending on underlying 
macroeconomic and financial conditions.” (Mohan, 2006b; italics our own). The question is 
whether the apparently discretionary and flexible approach of the RBI can systematically and 
empirically be described in practice by a Taylor-type rule, albeit with the possibility of regime 
switches. Based on description of the conduct of monetary policy by RBI officials, India appears 
to be a good candidate to be described by a regime switching model between hawk and dove 
regimes.  
Seemingly, no study has undertaken this line of research for India. In particular, we are 
aware of only three studies that have investigated monetary policy rules for India, none of which 
have considered regime switching.  In particular, Mohanty and Klau (2005) augment the Taylor 
rule to include changes in the real effective exchange rate. They use quarterly data from 1995 to 
2002 for thirteen emerging economies including India. They find that for India, the estimated 
inflation coefficient is relatively low whereas the output gap and real exchange rate change are 
                                                           
3 Owyang and Ramey (2004), Assenmacher-Wesche (2005) and Frommel et al. (2004) consider regime-switching 
models for monetary policy rules for advanced economies. No study of which we are aware applies regime-
switching models to monetary policy rules in developing or emerging market economies.  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significant determinants of the short-term interest rate. Virmani (2004) estimates monetary 
policy reaction functions for the Indian economy, with the monetary base (termed in the 
literature as the McCallum Rule) and interest rate (Taylor Rule) as alternative operating targets. 
He finds that a backward-looking McCallum rule tracks the evolution of the monetary base over 
the sample period (1992Q3-2001Q4) reasonably well, suggesting that RBI acts as if it is 
targeting nominal income when conducting monetary policy. In addition, neither of these studies 
explores the Indian central bank’s policy rule beyond the early 2000s. Hutchison et al. (2010) 
estimate more recent monetary policy rules for India. However, they only consider the possibility 
of limited structural breaks as opposed to systemic regime switches. 
The next section discusses the evolution of monetary policy in India and related 
literature. We summarize some of the major changes that took place in this sphere. The third 
section discusses the methodology and data. We describe Woodford’s version of the Taylor 
Rule, and how we adapt Hamilton’s Markov switching method to the case of monetary policy 
rules. We describe the data (quarterly data from 1987 to 2008), and procedures used to derive 
potential output, in particular. The fourth section discusses the results: in particular, the Markov 
switching model identifies two distinct regimes, which we label ‘hawk’ and ‘dove.’ We begin 
with a model that focuses on domestic variables, then consider the role of the exchange rate in 
monetary policy making. The fifth section concludes by summarizing our results and 
interpretation.   
 
2. Monetary Policy and Financial Liberalization in India 
The Indian economy experienced several major structural changes in financial markets 
and fiscal financing over the sample period that have influenced the conduct of monetary policy. 
As has been highlighted in debates about the timing of Indian economic reform (Panagariya, 
2008), there was no single “big bang” moment, especially with respect to the evolution of the 
financial sector, making it difficult to identify well-defined structural breaks in the Indian 
economy. Nonetheless, a number of key developments for monetary policy may be identified. 
Firstly, fiscal deficits are no longer automatically parked with public sector banks, or passively 
monetized by the RBI (Shah, 2008). Secondly, the liberalization of financial markets began in 
the late 1980s, moving towards a deeper financial sector and away from extreme financial 
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repression (Shah, 2008). The process of financial liberalization accelerated following the balance 
of payments crisis in 1991.  
Between 1991 and 1997, lending rates of commercial banks were deregulated, the issue 
of ad hoc treasury bills was phased out (thereby eliminating automatic monetization of the 
budget deficit), Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) and Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) rates were 
sharply reduced, and the RBI reactivated the refinance rate or bank rate (which is now used as a 
signaling rate to reflect the monetary policy stance). In 1994, India switched over to a mainly 
market-determined exchange rate system and instituted current account convertibility.  
The RBI appeared to loosely target monetary growth between 1980 and 1998 and, from 
then onwards, followed a multiple indicator approach with discretion. Starting in 1998, the RBI 
undertook strong monetary policy measures (increasing interest rates and withdrawing liquidity 
by raising the CRR) to combat concerns about excessive liquidity and speculation in the foreign 
exchange market. The foreign exchange market was characterized by a high degree of volatility 
following the onset of the Asian financial crisis towards the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998. 
These emergency measures were gradually reversed once the threat had abated of the crisis 
spilling over to India. 
The subsequent period, through the mid-2000s, saw the RBI continuing to refine its 
approach to macroeconomic management. With global and domestic inflation relatively low, the 
RBI set a band for target inflation of 4-5%, which was low by historical standards. It announced 
an intention to bring the CRR down, and move away from using the CRR as a policy instrument, 
focusing on interest rates instead (this intention was not realized, in practice). The RBI also 
continued to slowly ease capital controls, with implications for the functioning of domestic 
financial markets. Relaxations of capital controls included easing of requirements for and caps 
on foreign institutional investors (FIIs), streamlining of approval processes, and allowing FIIs to 
hedge exchange rate risk in currency forward markets. While domestic fixed income markets 
continued to be thin (as opposed to vibrant stock exchanges), especially for corporate bonds, a 
market for government securities did develop in this period.  
A significant development in this period was an institutional innovation by the RBI to 
manage its own open-market operations. The new institution, termed the Liquidity Adjustment 
Facility (LAF) was introduced on June 5, 2000, and operates through repo and reverse repo 
auctions, thereby setting a corridor for the short-term interest rates, consistent with the policy 
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objectives. The LAF therefore finally gave the RBI an explicit method for modulating short-term 
liquidity under varied financial market conditions, in order to influence call money rates. 
According to the RBI, the LAF has been operated “both as a tool for liquidity management and 
for interest rate signaling depending upon market conditions.” Furthermore, the method of 
operation of the LAF has itself been evolving over time, in addition to variations in response to 
changing market conditions. 
 A final aspect of changing monetary management was the increase in capital inflows that 
began in the last decade. Capital inflows, if unchecked, increase the domestic money supply, 
resulting in a looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. Capital inflows also put 
pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate. The RBI engaged in sterilization of inflows and 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in this time frame. In this period, therefore, the RBI 
apparently had to deal with trilemma of maintaining an independent monetary policy in the face 
of international capital flows and a desire to manage the exchange rate.  Accordingly, we will 
address international factors and the implications of increasing openness of the Indian economy 
in our empirical analysis of monetary policy in India. 
This brief institutional discussion suggests that a regime-switching Taylor rule may be 
appropriate to uncover the underlying preferences of the RBI’s decision-makers and particularly 
how they have evolved over time. Even given the seemingly discretionary nature of policy, as 
articulated in statements by the RBI, its revealed preferences may be well captured by a model of 
systematic, though time-varying, behavioral responses.  
 
3. Methodology and Data  
3.1 Theory and Estimation  
The Woodford (2001) version of the Taylor Rule for an open economy expresses the 
policy instrument—the interbank interest rate—as a function of the output gap, inflation target, 
the exchange rate and lagged interest rate. With constant coefficients, this policy rule may be 
written as: 
      (1) 
where it is the nominal interest rate, t is the year-on-year inflation rate (assuming a constant 
inflation target so the target is subsumed in the constant term of the equation) and yt is the output 
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gap at time t (deviation of actual output, measured as the index of industrial production, from 
potential output), et denotes the log of exchange rate and ∆ is the first difference operator. The 
expected signs of the estimated coefficients are: , ,  and  > 0. The rule indicates a 
relatively high interest rate when inflation is above its target, when the output is above its 
potential level, or when the central bank is attempting to limit exchange rate depreciation. The 
lagged interest rate is introduced to capture the inertia in optimal monetary policy, as specified 
by Woodford (2001). We use end of period quarterly data for all variables for the period 
1987Q1-2008Q4. 
Equation (1) is the standard model for the estimation of central bank policy functions. It 
assumes that the policy response to economic variables is stable over time. Some authors allow 
for a discrete shift in policy following a central bank reform or other institutional change. Our 
argument above, however, suggests that the central bank’s preferences may change in a 
systematic and predictable way such that there are switches between periods when inflation is the 
primary concern of policy (“Hawk” regime) and when the output gap is the primary concern of 
policy (“Dove” regime). The distinction between Hawk and Dove regimes is common in the 
literature (see Owyang and Ramey, 2004 and Assenmacher-Wesche, 2005, for recent 
references). This implies that a regime switching model that allows the coefficients to shift 
between two states (s = 1, 2) would be a better representation of monetary policy than the 
alternative of a one-regime (constant coefficients) model.4 In this circumstance, our estimation 
equation becomes:  
     (2) 
with St representing the state at time t, i.e. St =1.... k, where k is the number of states. Since we 
consider the switching to take place between 2 states (“Hawk” and “Dove” regimes), k = 2 in our 
case. In addition to switching the coefficients, we also allow the variance of the error term to 
switch simultaneously between the states, .  
Markov Switching Models (MSM), originally motivated by Goldfeld and Quandt (1960), 
have been popularized in business cycle and exchange rate analysis by Hamilton (1989) and 
Engel and Hamilton (1990). In our case, the model allows us to estimate how much weight the 
                                                           
4 As noted earlier, one can allow for structural breaks in estimation, but the regime-switching approach allows for a 
somewhat different approach to changing policy responses – the maintained hypothesis is of two policy stances, 
between which the policy maker chooses depending on economic conditions. 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RBI assigns to the relevant macroeconomic variables in two different regimes. In a MSM, 
switching between regimes does not occur deterministically but with a certain probability. In 
general terms, the evolution of the discrete, unobserved state-variable St is serially dependent 
upon St-1, St-2,…St-r, in which case the process is referred to as an rth order Markov switching 
process.  
As noted above, we assume a two-state, first order Markov switching process for St, 
characterized by constant transition probabilities pij= Pr{St = m|St-1 = n}. In particular, let P 
denote the 2 x 2 transition probability matrix for our two-state Markov process such that: 
 P =         (3) 
The estimation procedure classifies each observation as belonging to either regime. The regimes 
however, are not observed or specified ex-ante, but are estimated from the data.  
To estimate the model, we consider the joint distribution of it and St conditional on past 
information: 
     (4) 
where  denotes information at time t-1 and  is the conditional normal density 
function for the regime St=m. The likelihood function we estimate is a weighted average of the 
density functions for the two regimes, the weights being the probability of each regime: 
    (5) 
where the weighting term is the probability of being in each regime and is also 
referred to as the filtered probability. Given  , n = 1,2, at the beginning of time t 
the weighting terms  are calculated as:  
   (6) 
where , m  = 1, 2; n = 1, 2, are the transition probabilities (elements of matrix 
P above).5 Once Ψt is observed at the end of time t, the probabilities are updated using the 
                                                           
5 Equation (6) is useful in showing that while the transition probabilities are constant, the conditional probability of 
being in one regime or another depends on the history of the economy, summarized in the information available at 
that time, and therefore varies from period to period.  
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iterative filter, as discussed in Kim and Nelson (1999). The updated probabilities are calculated 
as follows: 
   (7) 
where  is given by the probability density function of a normal distribution for 
regime St = m. Note that this is simply Bayesian updating of the probabilities of being in each 
state, given the information available then. 
To start the filter at time t =1, we use the initial values obtained from an ordinary least 
squares regression. Once the coefficients of the model are estimated using an iterative maximum 
likelihood procedure and the transition probabilities are generated, we can use the algorithm in 
Kim and Nelson (1999) to derive the filtered probabilities for St using all the information up to 
time t i.e.  where t = 1, 2, …, T.6  
 
3.2 Data 
For the short-term policy rate, we use the overnight call money market rate.7 This is the 
standard interest rate used to indicate the policy stance of the central bank.The Indian central 
bank follows a multiple instrument approach to influence the call money rate. An important 
issue, especially in India, is the measurement of the output gap. Unlike advanced countries, there 
are no official measures of potential output levels. Virmani (2004) compared estimated potential 
GDP derived from an unobserved components model with estimates derived from a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter, and found little difference. Accordingly we derive the output gap using the 
HP filter for measuring trend output and taking the residual of the HP filter.8 To measure output, 
we use the Index of Industrial Production (IIP)9. Year-on-year inflation is measured using annual 
percentage change in the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). The WPI is the price level employed by 
the RBI to calculate “headline” inflation in India. All data are quarterly and the overall sample 
period is 1987q1 to 2008q4. We start our sample at 1987q1 because interest rate regulation 
                                                           
6 The MSM model is estimated using the MS-Regress Matlab package for Markov Regime Switching Models, 
developed by Marcelo Perlin (2009). 7 We use the call money market rate primarily because of availability of consistent data during our sample period.  
8 The HP filter output is sensitive to the endpoints, and we examine the robustness of our results to this issue: this 
point is taken up in the results section. 9 We also estimated output gap using real GDP (from 1994 onwards, conditional on data availability) and the results 
were found to be very similar. 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essentially fixed the money market rate prior to that time. With broad changes in the financial 
system in the late 1980s came money market deregulation and at that time it became the primary 
operating instrument of the central bank.  
Prior to estimation, several data issues were dealt with. (i) Analysis of linear plots and the 
Hylleberg-Engle-Granger-Yoo test suggest that the quarterly IIP series has multiplicative 
seasonality. Hence it was de-seasonalized using the X-12 ARIMA procedure. (i) Unit root tests, 
i.e. Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Perron, Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock and Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test results suggest the presence of unit root in the exchange rate series in 
levels, but the first difference of the series is stationary. Accordingly, the first difference of the 
nominal exchange rate was used. (iii) Durbin Watson and Breusch-Godfrey tests suggest the 
presence of serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test shows the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in error terms. Hence the OLS regressions have been run with the Newey-
West variance-covariance matrix, to correct for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
 Finally, we discuss our treatment of the interest rate series. Some other studies have used 
an average of the interest rate over the preceding quarter (or whatever the length of the period), 
presumably to capture the average policy stance for that period. However, this is not completely 
logical, since it creates a dependent variable that is partially determined prior to the right-hand 
side observations. Using the end-of-quarter interest rate avoids this inconsistency. However, for 
2007q4 there was an extreme spike in the interest rate that was recognized at the time as 
inadvertent, and not the result of a deliberate policy action. We have replaced this 
unrepresentative outlier by the average of interest rates in the weeks before and after that 
observation. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Preliminaries 
 Figures 1-3 show the movements between the output gap and inflation (Figure 1), interest 
rate and inflation (Figure 2), and interest rate and output gap (Figure 3) in India over the 1987q1 
to 2008q4 period. Table 1 shows the corresponding correlations between these series for the full 
sample (1987-2008), early sample (1987-1995) and later sample (1996-2008).  
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Figure 1 does not show a distinct pattern between the output gap (right-hand-side scale) 
and inflation (left-hand-side scale) during the full sample period (overall correlation = -0.02), 
although a weak positive (and statistically significant) correlation emerges in the later period 
(0.06). The “output-inflation tradeoff” is not clearly evident in simple co-movements in these 
variables, but the relationship may be masked by a variety of real and financial disturbances to 
the Indian economy as well as attributable to an activist monetary policy.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the interest rate and inflation. The interest rate is the 
overnight money market rate. Trend inflation has declined in India over the sample period. 
Inflation averaged about 9 percent, with wide variation (standard deviation of 2.9 percent), over 
the 1987 to 1995 period, and fell to around 5 percent during 1996-2007 as well as being more 
stable (standard deviation of 2.1 percent) in the latter period. Inflation jumped in mid-2008 in 
response to the world-wide food and energy price boom, but declined to the previous level by the 
end of 2008. Similarly, interest rates were at much higher average level and more variable in the 
first sub-period compared with the second sub-period. Lower levels and more stability in 
inflation are associated with lower and more stable interest rates. Beyond simple averages, 
however, the figure also suggests that the money market interest rate moves sluggishly in 
response to swings in the inflation rate, especially in the late sample period. This suggests that 
the RBI, in setting interest rates, has generally been slow to respond to inflation movements, with 
an overall contemporaneous correlation of 0.35 for the full sample.  
 Figure 3 shows the output gap (left-hand-side) and the money market interest rate (right-
hand-side). Overall, swings in the output gap are followed by similar changes in the interest rates 
(correlation 0.35) and this pattern is evident in both the early and latter sample periods. When the 
output gap is negative, interest rates tend to fall and vice versa. This correlation appears to be 
particularly strong in the early period (correlation 0.51), whereas in the late period the pattern is 
clearly evident during most cycles with two exceptions, and this is confirmed by the decline in 
the correlation coefficient after 1995. There also appears to be a range of (small) fluctuations in 
the output gap that does not elicit an interest rate policy response.  
In sum, it appears that the RBI responds both to the output gap and inflation in setting 
policy interest rates. Interestingly, the correlations for both series with money market interest 
rates are almost identical over the full sample period (0.35) and both correlations decline after 
1995, especially the contemporaneous linkage between interest rates and inflation.  
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 Another variable that the RBI may sometimes target is the exchange rate. The RBI itself 
has argued that its focus has been only on controlling volatility of exchange rate movements, 
rather than targeting the level of the exchange rate. However, some analyses (e.g., Patnaik 2007) 
have suggested that there has been a systematic attempt at times to manage the level of the 
nominal Rupee-Dollar rate. In order to address this issue, we extend the basic Taylor Rule model 
with a model that also includes the exchange rate as a determinant of policy.  
 
4.2 Constant Coefficient Estimates 
 The first column of coefficient estimates in Table 2 presents the results from estimating 
equation (2) assuming constant coefficients, and with the exchange rate omitted. The coefficients 
on the output gap, inflation and lagged interest rate are all significant at the 1% level and have 
signs predicted by theory. These estimates suggest that the RBI increases the overnight interest 
rate by 54 basis points in response to a one unit rise in the output gap (where positive increases 
in the output gap represent a rise in output relative to trend), and increases the interest rate by 33 
basis points in response to a 100 basis point rise in inflation. The lagged interest rate coefficient 
of 0.40 suggests considerable inertia in policy, so the long-run effects are substantially greater 
than the impact effects (i.e. the long-run effect on the interest rate of a unit change in the output 
gap is 0.89 and of a 100 basis point increase in inflation is 0.55). The long-run inflation-response 
of 0.55 is considerably less than what Woodford (2001) suggests would in principle (greater than 
1.0) be necessary to stabilize the economy.10  
 The constant term is also of interest. According to the formulation of Woodford (2001, 
equations 2.3 and 2.6), it captures the deviation of the baseline interest rate from the target values 
of the inflation rate and output gap, each weighted by the response coefficients embodied in the 
monetary policy rule. In an equilibrium rule, therefore, the constant term in the specification 
estimated in Table 2 should be zero. If a Taylor-type rule is being followed, therefore, we would 
expect the constant term to be zero. 
 
                                                           
10 Taylor (1993) suggested that a policy rule with coefficients of 0.5 on the output gap and 0.5 on inflation (from 
target) was able to predict U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate policy responses. His formulation includes a base 
inflation term on the right hand side, so that his inflation coefficient is equivalent to a magnitude of 1.5 in the 
Woodford (2001) specification, which is used here. The lagged interest rate term is not in the original Taylor 
specification, but does not affect the comparison once the long run effect is computed. 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4.3 Markov Switching Model 
In estimating the Markov Switching Model, we explore several variants of the base 
specification. This is necessary because of the complexity of the underlying economic dynamics, 
of the possible policy rule followed by the RBI, and of the estimation method itself. The specific 
role played by the exchange rate in Indian monetary policy conduct adds to this complexity. It is 
only by comparing estimates from different specifications and identifying robust features across 
the different results, that one can be reasonably confident about the policy rule that is potentially 
discovered by the empirical analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Output gap and inflation coefficient switching  
The second column of coefficients in Table 2 presents the initial regime switching model 
estimates, where both the output gap and inflation coefficients are subject to change between the 
different policy regimes. The output gap (inflation) coefficient estimate for state 1 is denoted by 
 ( ) and state 2 is denoted by  ( ). The lagged interest rate coefficient is given by . 
The table also presents the probability  of staying in state 1 (state 2,  ) if policy is already in 
state 1 (state 2). Unity minus this parameter gives the probability of switching from state 1 (state 
2) to state 2 (state 1). The error variances of state 1 and state 2 are also presented, as are the 
expected duration of staying state 1 and state 2 and the total log likelihood.   The results show a clear distinction between two regimes of  the RBI policy stance with  respect  to  the  coefficient  of  the  output  gap  but  not  the  inflation  coefficient.  The inflation coefficients in the two states are almost identical, while the output gap coefficient in the first state is less than half that of state 2. The state 2 output gap coefficient is quite close to the estimate for the constant coefficient model, and this is also true of the inflation coefficients in both states. The lower weight given to the output gap in state 1 characterizes this state as a Hawk regime, with a relative emphasis on inflation developments.  State 2 is characterized as a Dove regime with the relative emphasis on the output gap Several other 
observations on the results in Table 2 are noteworthy. First, the coefficient of the lagged interest 
rate is substantially higher in the regime switching model than is the case of the constant 
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coefficients estimates, reflecting more inertia.11 This implies that the long run impacts are now 
estimated to be higher, except for the long run response to the output gap in state 1, since other 
short run coefficients are similar. In fact, the long-run inflation responses are estimated to be 
1.19 and 1.25, in regimes 1 and 2, respectively, above the threshold of unity that marks a 
stabilizing monetary policy rule with respect to inflation.  Of course, the model also suggests that 
this response is very slow to be fully realized. The long run output gap coefficients are 0.69 and 
1.76, respectively. 
 Second, the estimates in Table 2 are consistent with the view of the former Deputy 
Governor of the RBI, since the expected lengths of the two regimes are quite short, being about 7 
and 4 quarters respectively. The probabilities of staying in each state are not inordinately low, at 
0.85 and 0.76 for states 1 and 2, respectively, but are low enough to lead to substantial switching 
between the two regimes. However, one significant difference between the two states is in the 
standard errors of the estimated regressions. The standard error for the Dove regime is about 14 
times as high as that of the Hawk regime, implying that the former’s overall variance is less well 
explained by the independent variables. 
Finally, note that the constant term in the switching regression is reduced essentially to 
zero, in contrast to the positive and significant value in the constant coefficient regression. As we 
noted earlier, a zero constant term is consistent with an equilibrium monetary policy rule, and we 
can take this feature of the estimation as a point in favor of the MSM approach over a constant 
coefficient model.  
 It is also important to examine the predicted time frames of the two different regimes. 
This information is captured probabilistically by the filtered probabilities (equations (6) and (7)). 
Figure 4 displays the filtered probabilities corresponding to the results of the regime switching 
model of Table 2. While these probabilities have several peaks and troughs, our sense is that the 
output booms of the late 1980s, mid 1990s and early 2000s are all associated with high 
probabilities of state 1, the “Hawk” regime. The idea here is that monetary policy is relatively 
less concerned with the output gap in these boom times, though the absolute stance toward 
inflation remains roughly the same across the two states. 
  
                                                           
11 The relative magnitude of the lagged interest rate coefficient in the MSM model versus the constant coefficients 
case is in line with intuition, since the latter estimates would tend to assign regime switching effects to faster 
responses. 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 4.3.2 Output gap switching 
 The results of the first specification of the MSM indicate that one can impose that 
constraint that the inflation coefficient does not switch across the two regimes. In other words, 
only the coefficient of the output gap switches. These estimates, still without any consideration 
of exchange rate policy responses, are presented in Table 3. The short run coefficients are now 
lower than the estimates in Table 2. However, the larger coefficient on the lagged interest rate 
term compensates for this change, and the long run coefficient estimates are very similar. The 
long-run output gap responses in states 1 and 2 are, respectively, 0.54 and 2.07, though the 
former is less precisely estimated than in the first specification. The estimated long-run inflation 
response, at 1.25, is essentially the same as the earlier state 2 long-run response estimate. The 
stability of the estimates reinforces the assumption that the restriction imposed here is valid.12 
The constant term in this case, and in subsequent MSM specifications stays at zero, supporting 
the robustness of the MSM approach as capturing equilibrium behavior. 
 The regression standard errors are much lower in Table 3 than in Table 2, but the relevant 
and striking difference is in the estimates of the transition probabilities. These are much higher 
than before, and as a result, the switching between regimes is highly attenuated. In fact, the 
expected duration of regime 2, the Dove regime, is as high as 10 years, and the graph of filtered 
probabilities for these estimates, in Figure 5, suggests that there are only two likely Dove 
periods, where the RBI was not giving much weight to the output gap – the two major booms of 
the late 1980s and the early 2000s. Given the dynamics of the Indian economy in the 1990s, we 
believe that this specification does not, therefore, fully capture the conduct of monetary policy 
over this period.13 This leads us to turn to considering external factors and exchange rate policy, 
which is believed to have had major implications for the conduct of domestic monetary policy at 
various times over the sample period (Patnaik, 2007). 
 
                                                           
12 We also estimated the MSM with only the inflation coefficient allowed to switch. The lagged interest coefficient 
and both inflation coefficients were almost identical to their counterparts in Table 3, as were most other features of 
the regression (standard errors, transition probabilities and average regime lengths. The output coefficient was 
insignificant, and the point estimate was close to the regime 1 point estimate in Table 3. This further supports the 
imposition of the constraint of no switching of the inflation coefficient. 
13 The estimates with only the inflation coefficient being allowed to switch, mentioned in the previous footnote, 
share this unsatisfactory feature. 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4.3.3 Output gap switching with an exchange rate term 
 Following on the previous discussion, we include the change in the log of the nominal 
exchange rate into the MSM model, with only the output gap coefficient being allowed to switch. 
The results in Table 4 provide further evidence of robustness of the basic approach. The two 
regimes differ in their output gap coefficients, with regime 1 being where the output gap receives 
less weight from policymakers. The short run coefficients in Table 4 are now back to being close 
to their values in Table 2, but the lower lagged interest rate coefficient means that the long run 
responses are once again similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. The estimated long-run responses to 
the output gap are 0.55 (regime 1) and 1.69 (regime 2). The long-run inflation response is 
estimated at 1.14, only slightly lower than the previous estimates. 
 The estimates in Table 4 retain the lower regression standard errors of the second 
specification, but have the lower transition probabilities and expected regime durations of the 
first specification. The associated filtered probability graphs (Figure 6) provide a picture of 
monetary policy responses in the 1990s that are close to those derived for the first specification, 
with some switching between the Hawk and Dove regimes, which differ in their stance toward 
the output gap. It appears that the Hawk and Dove regimes are each in force for roughly half the 
sample period, with well-defined episodes for each. 
Most importantly, the estimates in Table 4 have a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the exchange rate term, indicating that the RBI responded to exchange rate 
depreciations (appreciations) by increasing (decreasing) the interest rate. This is consistent with a 
nominal exchange rate target, or with an attempt to “smooth” or dampen exchange rate 
movements, and with other empirical analyses of RBI behavior (though not necessarily with the 
RBI’s own public position on its exchange rate stance). In many ways, therefore, the 
specification reported in Table 4 seems to be a reasonable, parsimonious description of the 
conduct of monetary policy in India over this period. 
 
4.3.4 Exchange rate switching 
 Given that the exchange rate appears to be an important target variable for monetary 
policy, it is worth checking if it is also subject to regime switching. We examine two alternative 
specifications. A baseline specification allows only the exchange rate coefficient to switch, so as 
not to force changes in the stance toward the exchange rate to be tied to changes in the stance 
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toward the output gap. Accordingly, Table 5 and Figure 7 present the results for the MSM model 
where only the exchange rate coefficient switches. However, Table 6 and Figure 8 also provide 
estimates where both the output gap and the exchange rate coefficients are allowed to switch 
between regimes. 
 The results with exchange rate switching demonstrate the robustness of the results in 
Table 4 (where only the coefficient of the output gap was allowed to switch). The coefficient of 
the inflation is stable across the three specifications, as is the coefficient of the lagged interest 
rate. The coefficients of the output gap in the two cases where switching is allowed on this 
dimension are also quite close (Tables 4 and 6). Furthermore, the filtered probability graphs are 
also similar across the three specifications, suggesting that the RBI adjusted its stance on several 
occasions in the 1990s, as well as during the booms of the late 1980s and early 2000s. 
 The regime-specific regression standard errors and constant terms are also very close 
across the three specifications that involve the exchange rate, as are the transition probabilities. 
In the case of joint switching of the output gap and exchange rate coefficients, the transition 
probabilities are slightly higher, resulting in somewhat longer expected durations of regimes in 
this case: about 14 quarters for regime 1 (almost double the other two cases) and about 8 quarters 
for regime 2 (versus about 6 in the other two cases). However, these longer expected durations 
are plausible, unlike the 10-11 year expected duration for regime 2 in Table 3.14 
 The exchange rate switching models therefore suggest that are results are robust, but also 
raise two additional, possibly related, puzzles. First, in both cases of exchange rate switching, the 
coefficient of the exchange rate in regime 2 is negative. This means that a depreciation in the 
nominal exchange rate (a positive difference in the variable as defined) is being met with a 
decrease in the interest rate, which would tend to accentuate the depreciation, rather than acting 
to stabilize the exchange rate (as would be the case with a positive coefficient). Second, in the 
case where both the coefficients of the output gap and the exchange rate are allowed to switch 
together, what can be the rationale for this pairing? In the case of the output gap and inflation, 
the idea that high inflation and high output go together is intuitively understandable in terms of 
                                                           
14 In an earlier draft of this paper, we estimated and presented an MSM model with the output gap and inflation 
coefficients both being allowed to switch, but with the exchange rate included (unlike Table 2). In that case also, 
only the two output booms toward the beginning and end of our sample period were identified as likely Hawk 
regimes, with the entire decade in between as the Dove regime.  The exchange rate coefficient was not significant, 
and the inflation coefficients in both regimes were similar, though marginally insignificant in regime 2. These 
observations suggest that either underdetermining the switching model (Table 3 here) or over determining it (the 
case of our previous draft) leads to a misspecification that shows up in failing to capture regime switches adequately. 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the business cycle, but here that obvious connection does not exist. Since the first puzzle is 
common across both final specifications, and there is strong evidence that switching of the 
output gap coefficient is appropriate, it makes sense to focus on the results of Table 6, where 
regime 2 has the interpretation as the Dove regime with respect to the output gap, and the gap is 
more negative (output is weak). In this case, a possible interpretation of our results is that the 
negative coefficient of the exchange rate represents an attempt at stimulating exports in a weak 
economy, rather than exchange rate targeting or inflation control. This is a conjecture that would 
require further investigation, but seems consistent with how exchange rate policy is viewed in 
the Indian media, or by Indian industry associations, for example.  
 Aside from the issue of whether the policy stance toward the exchange rate switches, the 
sequence of estimations we have presented does support the importance of the exchange rate in 
monetary policy (something that has not always emerged clearly in other estimates of Taylor-
type rules for India without allowing for switching). Even more clearly, the evidence points 
strongly toward a consistent inflation stance, mildly positive in its control effects, but with a 
substantially varying concern with respect to the output gap.15 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the conduct of monetary policy in India by estimating policy rules 
that may switch over time depending on the economic environment. The broader context is to 
explore the monetary policy regime of a large, dynamic, emerging market that apparently 
eschews the popular policy rule of explicit or implicit inflation targeting. Our primary question 
then is whether Indian monetary policy, usually described by RBI policymakers as highly 
discretionary, may in fact be described by simple policy rules as has been the case for many 
central banks. That is, is the RBI more systematic in policy implementation than it claims and 
may its policy be accurately described by quasi-IT or Taylor rule? Our specific methodological 
approach is estimation of Taylor-type (1993) rules along the lines of Woodford (2001), but 
allowing for switches in the preferences of the central bank over time using a regime  switching 
model (Hamilton, 1989).  
                                                           
15 We also investigated allowing the coefficients of all three variables to switch between regimes, but the model was 
not well-estimated in that instance. In any case, all the other evidence indicates a lack of switching in the inflation 
stance. 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Overall, our results suggest that RBI policy may be characterized by a regime switching 
model, with switches in regimes that are naturally characterized as Hawk and Dove regimes, 
over the 1987-2008 period. Based on the likelihoods of the two policy stances, the Dove regime 
appears to have been in force (at least 50 percent likelihood) about half of the entire period, 
comprising four (possibly five) well-defined episodes. The model estimates suggest that the RBI 
focuses relatively more on the output gap during the Dove regime, with attention to inflation 
being essentially the same across the Hawk and Dove regimes. We also found strong evidence 
that external considerations, represented here by movements in the exchange rate, systemically 
influenced RBI policy. This policy seems to have taken the standard form of responding to 
exchange rate depreciation (appreciation) by raising (lowering) the interest rate. However, there 
is also a possibility that the RBI took steps to stimulate exports when the economy was relatively 
weak (regime 2). 
In the context of the worldwide attention to inflation targeting approaches by central 
banks, we can also assert that no evidence of an exclusive concentration on inflation, or of 
inflation targeting was found in our analysis of Indian data. India, along with China, has not 
followed the trend of many emerging markets in adopting IT or quasi-IT monetary regimes. It is 
not the nominal anchor guiding monetary policy in India. The output gap seems to play an 
important role, and while inflation enters as a determinant of policy, our estimates also indicates 
a great deal of policy discretion followed by the RBI, as articulated by the central bank’s own 
senior officials.  
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Table 1: Correlations  
 1987q1-2008q4 1987q1-1995q4 1996q1-2008q4 
Output gap-Inflation -0.0246 -0.0373 0.0625 
Output gap-Interest rate 0.3541*** 0.5140*** 0.3525** 
Inflation-Interest rate 0.3530*** 0.2821* 0.0329 
 
Note: *** (**) (*) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2: Constant Coefficients and Regime Switching (Output Gap and Inflation)  
 
Parameters Constant Coefficients Switching Coefficients 
 0.5373*** 
(0.1898) 
0.2213* 
(0.1177) 
  0.5606*** 
(0.1000) 
 0.3421*** 
(0.1097) 
0.3786*** 
(0.0405) 
  0.4002*** 
(0.0710) 
 0.4042*** 
(0.0860) 
0.6811*** 
(0.0404) 
  0.85 
  0.76 
  2.8420*** 
(0.5055) 
  40.4376*** 
(7.9018) 
Constant 3.3261*** 
(0.8731) 
0.0000 
(0.0002) 
Expected Duration of 
Regime 1 
 6.87 
Expected Duration of 
Regime 2 
 4.18 
Final Log Likelihood  -225.3404 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3: Regime Switching (Output Gap Only) 
 
Parameters Switching Coefficients 
 0.1024 
(0.0924) 
 0.3913*** 
(0.0587) 
 0.2354*** 
(0.0978) 
 0.8110*** 
(0.0970) 
 0.90 
 0.98 
 0.5563 
(0.3736) 
 20.9685*** 
(5.4980) 
Constant 0.0000 
(0.0002) 
Expected Duration of Regime 1 10.36 
Expected Duration of Regime 2 43.06 
Final Log Likelihood -222.1531 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Regime Switching (Output Gap Only) with Exchange Rate 
 
Parameters Switching Coefficients 
 0.1890** 
(0.0782) 
 0.5760*** 
(0.0902) 
 0.3894*** 
(0.0404) 
 7.4694** 
(3.3821) 
 0.6589*** 
(0.0374) 
 0.86 
 0.84 
 2.4452*** 
(0.4283) 
 29.7200*** 
(2.0682) 
Constant 0.0000 
(0.0008) 
Expected Duration of Regime 1 7.35 
Expected Duration of Regime 2 6.32 
Final Log Likelihood -224.4692 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5: Regime Switching (Exchange Rate Only) 
 
Parameters Switching Coefficients 
 0.2726*** 
(0.0819) 
 0.3861*** 
(0.0426) 
 10.5081** 
(4.7422) 
 -16.6013*** 
(5.1837) 
 0.6718*** 
(0.0365) 
 0.87 
 0.84 
 2.6090*** 
(0.4148) 
 29.3076*** 
(2.5337) 
Constant 0.0000 
(0.0001) 
Expected Duration of Regime 1 7.79 
Expected Duration of Regime 2 6.26 
Final Log Likelihood -224.1054 
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Table 6: Regime Switching (Output Gap and Exchange Rate) 
 
Parameters Switching Coefficients 
 0.2212*** 
(0.0645) 
 0.5399*** 
(0.1527) 
 0.3810*** 
(0.0389) 
 11.7969** 
(5.0357) 
 -15.3889** 
(6.2878) 
 0.6680** 
(0.0312) 
 0.93 
 0.88 
 2.6367*** 
(0.4298) 
 28.6072*** 
(2.8689) 
Constant 0.0000 
(0.0001) 
Expected Duration of Regime 1 13.86 
Expected Duration of Regime 2 8.36 
Final Log Likelihood -224.2626 
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Figure 1: Output Gap and Inflation (WPI)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interest Rate and Inflation (WPI)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-10.00 
-5.00 
0.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
20.00 
19
87
:Q
1 
19
87
:Q
4 
19
88
:Q
3 
19
89
:Q
2 
19
90
:Q
1 
19
90
:Q
4 
19
91
:Q
3 
19
92
:Q
2 
19
93
:Q
1 
19
93
:Q
4 
19
94
:Q
3 
19
95
:Q
2 
19
96
:Q
1 
19
96
:Q
4 
19
97
:Q
3 
19
98
:Q
2 
19
99
:Q
1 
19
99
:Q
4 
20
00
:Q
3 
20
01
:Q
2 
20
02
:Q
1 
20
02
:Q
4 
20
03
:Q
3 
20
04
:Q
2 
20
05
:Q
1 
20
05
:Q
4 
20
06
:Q
3 
20
07
:Q
2 
20
08
:Q
1 
20
08
:Q
4 
Inﬂa%on  Output‐gap 
0.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
20.00 
25.00 
30.00 
19
87
:Q
1 
19
87
:Q
4 
19
88
:Q
3 
19
89
:Q
2 
19
90
:Q
1 
19
90
:Q
4 
19
91
:Q
3 
19
92
:Q
2 
19
93
:Q
1 
19
93
:Q
4 
19
94
:Q
3 
19
95
:Q
2 
19
96
:Q
1 
19
96
:Q
4 
19
97
:Q
3 
19
98
:Q
2 
19
99
:Q
1 
19
99
:Q
4 
20
00
:Q
3 
20
01
:Q
2 
20
02
:Q
1 
20
02
:Q
4 
20
03
:Q
3 
20
04
:Q
2 
20
05
:Q
1 
20
05
:Q
4 
20
06
:Q
3 
20
07
:Q
2 
20
08
:Q
1 
20
08
:Q
4 
Inflation Interest rate 
 29 
Figure 3: Interest Rate and the Output Gap  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Estimated Regime Probabilities, Regime Switching (Output Gap and Inflation) 
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Figure 5: Estimated Regime Probabilities, Regime Switching (Output Gap Only) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Estimated Regime Probabilities, Regime Switching (Output Gap Only) with Exchange Rate 
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Figure 7: Estimated Regime Probabilities, Regime Switching (Exchange Rate Only)  
   
Figure 8: Estimated Regime Probabilities, Regime Switching (Output Gap and Exchange Rate) 
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